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GAME THEORY

Academic Year 2026/2027 - Teacher: LAURA ROSA MARIA SCRIMALI

Expected Learning Outcomes

The course aims to introduce fundamental concepts in static and dynamic games. The course provides students with analytic tools in order to model and foresee situations in which players (consumers, firms, governments, etc.) strategically interact. The interest focuses on applications in economics and biology.


The goals of the course are:

to acquire base knowledge that allows students to understand strategic interaction problems;

to acquire valuable knowledge to model real-life game theory problems; 

to implement correct solutions for complex decisional problems;

to acquire base communication skills using technical language;

to provide students with theoretical and practical methodologies in order to deal with several strategic problems that can be met during the study and the work activity; 

to acquire further knowledge on the issues related to game theory.

 

Course Structure

Teaching Organization
credit value 6 - 42 hours
total study 150 hours
108 hours of individual study
42 hours of frontal lecture


For this course, there will be 2 hours of teaching per lecture twice a week. The course includes classroom lessons and exercises. Teaching material will be available on Studium.


Part of the programme (max 3CFU)  could be done by a visiting professor (Italian or not).

If the course is delivered in blended or remote mode, appropriate adjustments may be made to the above, to ensure consistency with the syllabus.

Required Prerequisites

Fundamental knowledge of functions of one and two variables, analytic geometry and linear algebra.

 

Attendance of Lessons

Attendance is strongly recommended (see the Didactic Regulations of the L35 Mathematics Degree Program).

 

Detailed Course Content

STATIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION (20 hours)

Representation of a game. Dominant solutions and iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Pure and mixed strategies. Nash equilibrium. Cournot model. Zero-sum games. MInimax solutions. Von Neumann' theorem. 

DYNAMIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION (8 hours)

Backward induction. Stackelberg duopolistic model. Subgame perfect equilibrium. Repeated games.

STATIC GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION (8 hours)

Bayesian games. Signaling games. Correlated equilibria.

COOPERATIVE GAMES (6 hours)

Cooperative games with transferable and non-transferable utility. Core and Shapley value. 

Software for solving game theory problems.

 

Goals of U. N. Agenda for Sustainable Development

This course contributes to the achievement of the following goals of U. N. Agenda for Sustainable Development

 

Goal N. 4 Quality Education

      Target 4.3

     Target 4.7

        

 

Goal N. 13  Climate Action

                          Target  13.3


Method: classroom lesson

Textbook Information

[1] J. González-Díaz, I. García-Jurado, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, An Introductory Course on Mathematical Game Theory American Mathematical Soc., 2010

[2] M.J. Osborne, A course in game theory, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1994. 

[3] R. Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Rconomists, Princeton University Press, 1992.

 

Course Planning

 SubjectsText References
1Representation of a game. González-Díaz, chap. 2
2Dominated strategy and Nash equilibrium González-Díaz, chap. 2, Osborne, chap. 2-3-4
3Zero-sum gameGonzález-Díaz, chap. 2
4Extensive gamesGonzález-Díaz chap. 3, Gibbons chap. 2
5Games with incomplete informationGonzález-Díaz chap. 4, Gibbons chap. 3
6Cooperative gameGonzález-Díaz chap. 5

Learning Assessment

Learning Assessment Procedures

The final exam consists of an oral test during which the candidate is also requested to solve a numerical exercise. The final grade is established on the basis of the answers given by the candidate and the solving of the numerical example.
Final grades will be assigned taking into account the following criteria:
Rejected: Basic knowledge has not been acquired. The student is not able to solve simple exercises.
18-23: Basic knowledge has been acquired. The student solves simple exercises, has sufficient communication skills, and makes judgements.
24-27: All the knowledge has been acquired. The student solves all the proposed exercises making few errors and has good communication skills and making judgements.
28-30 cum laude: All the knowledge has been completely acquired. The student applies knowledge and has excellent communication skills, learning skills and making judgements.
 
Learning assessment may also be carried out on-line, should the conditions require it.


To ensure equal opportunities and in compliance with current laws, interested students may request a personal interview in order to plan any compensatory and/or dispensatory measures based on educational objectives and specific needs. Students can also contact the CInAP (Centro per l’integrazione Attiva e Partecipata — Servizi per le Disabilità e/o i DSA) referring teacher within DMI (https://web.dmi.unict.it/it/corsi/lm-18/referente-cinap).


To take part in the final exam, students must register through the SmartEdu portal. For any technical issues related to the registration, please contact the Student Office.

Examples of frequently asked questions and / or exercises

Nash equilibrium definition. Minimax. Computation of Nash equilibrium with pure and mixed strategies. Dominated solutions. Zero-sum game. Nash theorem. Prisoner's dilemma. Cooperative games. Imputations and core.